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An essential tension can be found between researchers interested in ecological validity
and those concerned with maintaining experimental control. Research in the human
neurosciences often involves the use of simple and static stimuli lacking many of
the potentially important aspects of real world activities and interactions. While this
research is valuable, there is a growing interest in the human neurosciences to use
cues about target states in the real world via multimodal scenarios that involve visual,
semantic, and prosodic information. These scenarios should include dynamic stimuli
presented concurrently or serially in a manner that allows researchers to assess
the integrative processes carried out by perceivers over time. Furthermore, there
is growing interest in contextually embedded stimuli that can constrain participant
interpretations of cues about a target’s internal states. Virtual reality environments proffer
assessment paradigms that combine the experimental control of laboratory measures
with emotionally engaging background narratives to enhance affective experience
and social interactions. The present review highlights the potential of virtual reality
environments for enhanced ecological validity in the clinical, affective, and social
neurosciences.
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INTRODUCTION
The issue of ecological validity in psychological assessment has been expressed a number of
times over the years via discussions of the limitations of generalizing sterile laboratory findings
to the processes normally occurring in people’s everyday lives. In 1978, Neisser presented
an opening address at the first International Conference on Practical Aspects of Memory,
in which he contended that the experiments found in cognitive psychology were conducted
in artificial settings and employed measures that have few counterparts in everyday life. In
Neisser’s view such research lacks ecological validity and fails to generalize beyond constrained
laboratory settings. In Banaji and Crowder (1989) countered Neisser’s arguments with the claim
that the ecological approach lacks the internal validity and experimental control needed for
scientific progress. This exchange resulted in a schism between researchers striving for ecological
validity and those interested in maintaining experimental control. A great deal of controversy
resulted over whether cognitive assessments should emphasize laboratory-based control or
more naturalistic approaches (Neisser, 1982; Conway, 1991). A special issue of the American
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Psychologist (1991) was devoted to this debate. Although
the debate over which was superior for cognitive psychology
eventually subsided (deWall et al., 1994), the search for a balance
of everyday activities and laboratory control has a long history in
clinical neuroscience (Wilson, 1993; Franzen andWilhelm, 1996;
Sbordone and Long, 1996; Chaytor and Schmitter-Edgecombe,
2003; Burgess et al., 2006; Chaytor et al., 2006; Sbordone, 2008)
and has most recently been discussed in the affective and
social neurosciences (Ochsner, 2004; Schilbach et al., 2006, 2013;
Chakrabarti, 2013).
One methodology that has potential for a laboratory
vs. everyday functioning rapprochement is virtual reality.
Virtual reality makes use of virtual environments to present
digitally recreated real world activities to participants via
immersive (head-mounted displays) and non-immersive
(2D computer screens) mediums. Recent advances in virtual
reality technology allow for enhanced computational capacities
for administration efficiency, stimulus presentation, automated
logging of responses, and data analytic processing. Since virtual
environments provide experimental control and dynamic
presentation of stimuli in ecologically valid scenarios, they allow
for controlled presentations of emotionally engaging background
narratives to enhance affective experience and social interactions
(Gorini et al., 2011; Diemer et al., 2015).
OVERVIEW AND PLAN FOR THE PAPER
This review aims to describe the potential of virtual reality
for precise presentation and control of dynamic perceptual
stimuli that can be used for assessment of neurocognitive
and affective processing while participants are immersed in
simulations of real world contexts. A number of studies in the
context of clinical, affective, and social neuroscience research
are discussed. While neuroscientific research is highlighted
throughout, many of the examples provided reflect assessments
of behavioral performance. Although it can be challenging to
operationalize the extent to which a stimulus approximates
activities of daily living, this review gives examples of stimuli
and virtual environment-based contexts that span the implied
continuum. This review is not meant to be exhaustive. Instead
this review focuses upon research that highlights the ways
in which persons respond to clinical, affective, and social
stimuli in simulations that approximate real world activities
and interactions. The plan for this paper will be as follows:
Current Needs for Ecologically Valid Assessments in the
Clinical, Affective and Social Neuroscience ‘‘Section’’ discusses
current needs for ecologically valid assessments in the clinical,
affective, and social neuroscience. For each of these three
areas there will be a discussion of current methods and the
potential limitations of these approaches for ecologically valid
assessments. In Virtual Reality for Enhanced Ecological Validity
and Experimental Control ‘‘Section’’, virtual environments
are introduced as methodologies for enhanced ecological
validity and experimental control. The potential of virtual
environments for clinical, affective, and social neurosciences is
presented. Limitations of virtual environments are presented.
The manuscript ends with a brief summary and discussion
of the ways in which virtual environments can be used for
studying how persons respond to clinical, affective, and social
stimuli in simulations that approximate real world activities and
interactions.
Current Needs for Ecologically Valid
Assessments in the Clinical, Affective and
Social Neuroscience
Clinical Neuroscience and the Ecological Validity
Discussion
The everyday vs. laboratory discussion has continued for the
clinical neuroscience specialty of clinical neuropsychology.
Much of the impetus for the continued discussion came
from a shift in praxes from the ‘‘deficit measurement
paradigm’’ to a new paradigm emphasizing functional
competence (Chelune and Moehle, 1986). With the advent
and development of neuroimaging there was decreased
requirement for neuropsychological assessments to localize
lesions and an increased need for neuropsychologists to describe
behavioral manifestations of neurologic disorders. Franzen and
Wilhelm (1996) refined the definition of ecological validity
for neuropsychological assessment via an emphasis upon
two requirements: (1) Veridicality, in which the patient’s
performance on a construct-driven measure should predict
some feature(s) of the patient’s day-to-day functioning (e.g.,
vocational status; Bayless et al., 1989; Dunn et al., 1990;
Lysaker et al., 1995) and (2) Verisimilitude, in which the
requirements of a neuropsychological measure and the
testing conditions should resemble requirements found in
a patient’s activities of daily living (Spooner and Pachana,
2006). Early discussions of verisimilitude in neuropsychology
emphasized that the technologies current to the time could not
replicate the environment in which the behavior of interest
would ultimately take place (Goldstein, 1996). Almost 20
years later, most neuropsychological assessments represent
outdated technologies (e.g., paper and pencil assessments;
static stimuli) that are yet to be validated with respect to
real-world functioning (Rabin et al., 2007). Further, current
verisimilitude assessments are somewhat conflicted in that
while they focus on cognitive constructs (e.g., attention,
executive function, memory), they are used for identifying
functional abilities (Chaytor and Schmitter-Edgecombe,
2003).
Construct-driven measures without regard for prediction
of ‘‘functional’’ behavior
In a more recent development of the ecological validity
discussion Burgess et al. (2006) have argued that the majority
of neuropsychological assessments currently in use today
were developed to assess cognitive ‘‘constructs’’ (e.g., working
memory) without regard for their ability to predict ‘‘functional’’
behavior. For example, one of the most widely used measures
of executive function is the Wisconsin Card Sort Test
(WCST; Heaton et al., 1993). The WCST (like many paper-
and-pencil tests in use today) was not originally developed
as a measure of executive functioning. Instead, the WCST
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was preceded by a number of sorting measures that were
developed from observations of the effects of brain damage
(e.g., Weigl, 1927). Nevertheless, in a single study by Milner
(1963), patients with dorsolateral prefrontal lesions were found
to have greater difficulty on the WCST than patients with
orbitofrontal or nonfrontal lesions. However, the majority of
neuroimaging studies have found activation across frontal and
non-frontal brain regions and clinical studies have revealed that
the WCST does not discriminate between frontal and non-
frontal lesions (Stuss et al., 1983; Nyhus and Barceló, 2009).
Further, while data from the WCST does appear to provide
some information relevant to the constructs of set shifting
and working memory, the data does not necessarily offer
information that would allow a neuropsychologist to predict
what situations in everyday life require the abilities that the
WCST measures.
The WCST is not the only neuropsychological assessment
to fall short of achieving ecological validity. Other tests such
as the Stroop and Tower tests were also not developed to
be used as clinical measures (Burgess et al., 2006). Instead,
these measures were developed for cognitive assessments
in nonclinical populations and only later found their way
into the clinical realm. For example, neuropsychologists use
the Stroop to assess the differences between performance
on the automatic (e.g., word reading) and controlled (e.g.,
interference) conditions to make judgements about a patient’s
difficulties with everyday functioning. The predictions are
predominantly based on the assumption that the performance
on a controlled process (inhibition of a prepotent response)
reflects constructs that are important to carrying out real-world
functions. A neuropsychologist may predict that a patient’s
inability to inhibit an automatic response like reading words
during the Stroop interference task means that the patient
may also have problems inhibiting an impulse to put on
the breaks if a traffic light turns red and the driver is
already partway through an intersection (Marcotte and Grant,
2009).
Function-led tests that are representative of real-world
functions
A more ecological approach to neuropsychological assessment
is to move from construct driven assessments to tests that are
representative of real-world functions and proffer results that
are generalizable for prediction of the functional performance
across a range of situations. According to Burgess et al.
(2006), a function-led approach to creating neuropsychological
assessments will include neuropsychological models that proceed
from directly observable everyday behaviors backward to
examine the ways in which a sequence of actions leads to
a given behavior in normal functioning; and the ways in
which that behavior might become disrupted. As such, he
calls for a new generation of neuropsychological tests that
are ‘‘function led’’ rather than purely ‘‘construct driven.’’
A number of investigators have argued that performance
on traditional neuropsychological construct driven tests (e.g.,
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Stroop) has little correspondence
to activities of daily living (Manchester et al., 2004; Sbordone,
2008; Bottari et al., 2009). According to Chan et al. (2008),
most of these traditional construct driven measures assess at
the veridicality level and do not capture the complexity of
response required in the many multistep tasks found in everyday
activities.
Real-world assessments using the multiple errands tasks:
potential and limitations
A number of function-led tests have been developed that
assess cognitive functioning in real-world settings. For example,
Shallice and Burgess (1991) developed the Multiple Errands Test
(MET) as a function-led assessment of multitasking in a hospital
or community setting. Patients (e.g., patients with prefrontal
injuries) perform a number of relatively simple but open-
ended tasks (e.g., buying particular items, writing down specific
information, traveling to a specific location) without breaking
a series of arbitrary rules. The examiner observes the patient’s
performance and writes down the number and type of errors
(e.g., rule breaks, omissions). The MET has been shown to have
increased sensitivity (over construct driven neuropsychological
tests) to elicit and detect failures in attentional focus and
task implementation. It has also been shown to be better at
predicting behavioral difficulties in everyday life (Alderman
et al., 2003). However, there are a number of unfortunate
limitations for the traditional MET that are apparent in
the obvious drawbacks to experiments conducted in real-
life settings. Functional-led neuropsychological assessments can
be time consuming, require transportation, involve consent
from local businesses, costly, and difficult to replicate or
standardize across settings (Rand et al., 2009; Logie et al.,
2011). Further, there are times when function-led assessments in
real-world settings are not feasible for patients with significant
behavioral, psychiatric, or mobility difficulties (Knight et al.,
2002).
In summary, early discussions of verisimilitude in
neuropsychology emphasized that the technologies current
to the time could not replicate the environment in which the
behavior of interest would ultimately take place. Today, most
neuropsychological assessments continue to represent outdated
technologies and static stimuli that are yet to be validated
with respect to real-world functioning. While much of the
early discussion of ecological validity reflected an emphasis
upon veridicality and verisimilitude, Burgess et al. (2006) have
updated the discussion to include differentiating of construct
driven assessments from function led neuropsychological
assessments. While a number of function-led approaches have
been developed, there are obvious drawbacks (time consuming,
require transportation, involve consent from local businesses,
costly, and difficult to replicate or standardize across settings) to
experiments conducted in real-life settings.
Affective Neuroscience: Importance of Affective
States for Cognitive Processing
Historically, much of psychology has been understood
as comprising three related fields: cognition; affect; and
motivation. Until recently, cognitive psychology has been
the most extensively studied of the three, with affect and
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 December 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 660
Parsons Virtual Reality for Enhanced Ecological Validity
motivation being comparatively neglected (Baddeley, 1981).
While cognition can be studied relatively easily in the
laboratory, affect and motivation call for assessment of real
world activities (Masmoudi et al., 2012). In recent years, this
emphasis upon cognition alone has been challenged by a
growing body of research into emotions (Stuss and Levine,
2002; Kohler et al., 2010). Cromwell and Panksepp (2011)
describe the historically cognitive emphasis as a top-down
(cortical→ subcortical) perspective that could hinder progress
in understanding neurological and psychiatric disorders.
As an alternative, they emphasize inclusion of bottom-up
(subcortical→ cortical) affective and motivational state-control
perspectives.
Dual process approach to affective neuroscience
According to Panksepp (2005, 2007), progress in human
neuroscience has resulted in an understanding that brain
areas are involved in both non-salient ‘‘Cold’’ and affectively
‘‘Hot’’ cognitions. Panksepp has found support for this view
in Goel and Dolan (2003) examination of the neural basis of
emotionally neutral (‘‘Cold’’) and affectively salient (‘‘Hot’’)
reasoning using event-related fMRI. Findings revealed that a
reciprocal engagement of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC)
for ‘‘Cold’’ and vmPFC for ‘‘Hot’’ processing provides evidence
for a dynamic neural system for information processing. The
pattern of which is robustly influenced by affective saliency.
This approach emphasizes distinction between executive
inhibition and reactive inhibition (Nigg, 2003). Executive
inhibition involves top-down (cortical → subcortical) effortful
neurcognitive processing aimed at inhibitory control (Nigg,
2000, 2003); and reactive disinhibition reflects bottom-up
(subcortical → cortical) processes, in which the individual
attempts to regulate behavior in affect-laden situations (Nigg,
2003, 2006). This affective neuroscience approach represents
a more embodied view which accepts that cognitions are
essentially related to both the participant’s neurology and the
environments in which study participants operate (Panksepp,
2009, 2010).
Within affective neuroscience, the dual process approach
of ‘‘Hot’’ and ‘‘Cold’’ processing is prevalent among human
neuroscientists (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Goel and Dolan,
2003; Kerr and Zelazo, 2004; Bechara and Damasio, 2005;
Seguin et al., 2007; Chan et al., 2008; Brock et al., 2009;
Potenza and de Wit, 2010; Rubia, 2011). With this prevalence
in mind, this review focuses on studies that have explicitly
measured and/or manipulated a factor commonly linked to
‘‘Cold’’ cognitive and/or ‘‘Hot’’ affective processing. The Cold
cognitive control found in top-down executive functioning is
contrasted with Hot affective aspects of cognitive control found
in bottom-up processing (Zelazo et al., 2003). While Cold
cognitive processing tends to be relatively logic-based and free
frommuch affective arousal, Hot affective processing occurs with
reward and punishment, self-regulation, and decision-making
involving personal interpretation (Seguin et al., 2007; Chan et al.,
2008; Brock et al., 2009). A number of studies have found that
impairments in either the Cold orHot cognitive functionsmay be
related to deficits in everyday decision making and functioning
(e.g., independance at home, ability to work, school attendance,
and social relations; for review, see Chan et al., 2008).
Dual Process Approach, the Somatic Marker
Hypothesis, and the Iowa Gambling Task
The idea of Hot decision making has been described as
being consistent with the somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara
and Damasio, 2005), in which the experience of an emotion
(e.g., gut feeling; hunch) results in a somatic marker that
guides choice of action. The somatic marker is hypothesized
to play a role in Hot decision making in that it biases
the available response selections found in decision making
tasks. When persons are faced with decisions, they experience
somatic sensations in advance of real consequences of possible
different alternatives. The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara,
2007) is a computerized assessment of reward-related decision-
making that measures temporal foresight and risky decision-
making (Bechara et al., 1994). Neuroimaging studies of persons
performing the IGT have revealed activation in the orbitofrontal
cortex (Grant et al., 1999; Ernst et al., 2002; Windmann
et al., 2006), which appears to be significant for signaling
the anticipated rewards/punishments of an action and for
adaptive learning (Schoenbaum et al., 2011). Evidence for
the somatic marker hypothesis’s role in Hot decision making
over IGT trials can be found in the demonstration of an
anticipatory electrodermal response in healthy controls to card
selection (Bechara et al., 1996, 1997). For example, prior to
selecting a card from a risky deck, a healthy control will
show a physiological reaction indicating that the participant
is experiencing bodily the anticipated risk. Further, studies
have shown that damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) and the amygdala prevents the use of somatic
(affective) signals for advantageous decision making (Bechara
et al., 1996, 1998, 2000). It is noteworthy that there are different
roles played by the vmPFC and amygdala in decision-making.
While vmPFC patients were able to generate electrodermal
responses when they received a reward or a punishment,
amygdala patients failed to do so (Bechara et al., 1999).
Whereas the IGT may have potential for assessment of ‘‘Hot’’
affective processing (Baddeley, 2012), researchers have argued
that the IGT is deficient for understanding the affective impact
of emotional stimuli upon cognitive processing because the
observed effects on the IGT may simply be assessing cognitive
(not affective) construct demands resulting from such a complex
decision task (Hinson et al., 2002, 2003). Further, like other
cognitive measures, the IGT was created to assess the construct
of decision making in a laboratory setting, but it remains
to be seen whether a relation between performance on the
IGT and real-world decision making exists (Buelow and Suhr,
2009).
Dual process approach to moral decision making
Differentiating aspects of Cold cognitive processing and Hot
affective processing are increasingly being found in moral
decision making (Greene et al., 2001, 2004). Similar to
neuroimaging studies into the somatic marker hypothesis using
the IGT, the orbitofrontal cortex has been implicated in moral
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decision making. Lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex result in
abnormal social behavior and deficits in moral decision making.
(Berthoz et al., 2002; Takahashi et al., 2004). The affective
neuroscience of ethical dilemmas is reflected in vignettes that
challenge a participant to deliberate over intentionally harming
an innocent character in order to promote the greater good
of other characters in the vignette. This greater good reflects
a utilitarian (i.e., consequentialist) decision to act in a way
that will bring about the best overall consequences for a
group of persons at the cost of a single individual’s wellbeing.
Examples of moral decision making assessment include the
Trolley and Footbridge Dilemmas, in which the participant
reads a text in which a runaway trolley is heading for five
immobile people on its tracks (Thomson, 1985; Greene et al.,
2004). If the trolley is allowed to continue unmoved from its
course, it will kill the five people. In the text of the Footbridge
Dilemma, the participant is standing next to a very large
stranger on a footbridge spanning the tracks through which the
trolley will travel (Thomson, 1985; Greene et al., 2004). The
participant’s only option for saving the five defenseless persons
is to heave the large stranger off the footbridge. While this
will kill the large persons, it also has the value of blocking
the trolley from killing the five helpless persons. Participants
reading these vignettes often find it difficult to decide that
one answer (kill the large person to save the five others) is
preferable to the other (saving the large person, but let the
five die).
A dual-process theory has been proposed to describe the
processes involved in resolving these moral dilemmas. According
to the dual-process perspective both controlled cognitive
responses and automatic affective responses perform essential
roles in moral decision making (see also Greene et al., 2008):
(1) Automatic and Hot affective processes drive non-utilitarian
processes and reflect prohibition of harm, in which negative
affective responses are generated in the medial prefrontal cortex
and the amygdala (Greene et al., 2001, 2004) and (2) Controlled
and Cold cognitive evaluations drive utilitarian judgments
and weigh the costs and benefits associated with an action.
Neuroimaging research has demonstrated that damage to the
vmPFC results in moral decisions promoting harmful behavior
when it will result in the promotion of a greater good (Ciaramelli
et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007). While judgments of correct
actions when reading these hypothetical trolley dilemmas tend to
involve controlled (e.g., Cold) cognitive processes, the decision to
apply direct physical force triggers automatic (e.g., Hot) affective
responses.
A limitation of these hypothetical moral dilemmas is that
while they have been effective in enhancing our understanding
of moral decision making, they do little to expand our
knowledge of how these vignettes translate into real-world
behaviors. While the use of text-based scenario descriptions
(at times accompanied by a picture illustrating the scenario)
and/or graphic-based questionnaires offer the experimental
control found in laboratory-based assessment, the static
presentation limits the contextual features of the dilemmas
(Patil et al., 2014). Consequently, results from both paper-
and-pencil and fMRI investigations may overestimate cognitive
processes and underestimate important dynamic situational and
affective components of the moral dilemmas (Bzdok et al.,
2012).
Social Neuroscience and the Need for Dynamic
Stimulus Presentations
Neisser (1982) call for cognitive assessments that can generalize
beyond the narrow laboratory context has recently surfaced in
the context of social neuroscience. Many of the pioneering
paradigms in social neuroscience reflect a noteworthy
emphasis upon laboratory control and experiments that
involve participants observing static stimuli (e.g., simple, static
representations of socially relevant stimuli; static photographs
of emotionally valenced facial expressions) that are devoid of
interactions (Morris et al., 1996; Blair et al., 1999). Although
social neuroscience researchers have assumed that knowledge
gained using these static stimuli will generalize to the social
cognition in everyday activities, a number of researchers are
beginning to question this assumption (Ochsner, 2004; Schilbach
et al., 2006, 2013; Chakrabarti, 2013). This has led to confusion
about the neural bases of interpersonal understanding because
studies of shared representations between self and others usually
ask the perceiver to observe and imitate target movements or
have participants directly rate their own sensory states and
observe those states in others. This is done without requiring
participants to make any judgments about target states. Further,
researchers examining the shared representations and mental
state attributions of perceivers often make use of static stimuli
that fail to represent the types of social information that
participants must process when they experience dynamic stimuli
in real-life social interactions (Zaki and Ochsner, 2009; Risko
et al., 2012; Schilbach, 2015).
Differences between real-life social information and
laboratory stimuli
Zaki and Ochsner (2009) stress three critical ways that real-life
social information differ from laboratory stimuli. Specifically,
they discuss the ways in which cues about target states in
the real world are: (1) Multimodal (include visual, semantic,
and prosodic information); (2) Dynamic in that stimuli
are presented serially or concurrently to participants over
time; and (3) Contextually embedded so that participants
are presented with stimuli and environmental information
that can frame their interpretation of another’s internal
states. Multimodal stimuli are important for an ecologically
valid social neuroscience because social mentalizing and
interactions occur in situations that involve the convergence
of multiple channels such as auditory perception of social
cues (verbal utterances, intonation, prosody); visual perception
of social cues (nonverbal communication, gestures, postures,
facial expressions); and emotional perception (positive and
negatively valenced representations of the other’s internal states).
Zaki and Ochsner (2009) emphasize the importance of the
emotional modality because early neuroimaging studies of
emotion treated cognitive phenomena as qualities (shape, size,
or color) of a stimulus. They give the example of showing
participants negatively valenced stimuli (e.g., gruesome picture)
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 December 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 660
Parsons Virtual Reality for Enhanced Ecological Validity
and then infer that this caused the participant to experience
negative affect without actually measuring the participant’s
subjective experience or other behavioral indices of emotional
responding.
Need for dynamic stimuli
There is also need for greater emphasis upon dynamic stimuli
that will allow assessment of participants as they act upon
stimuli interactively instead of a passive response to static stimuli.
While limiting stimuli to static representations with constrained
variance along tractable dimensions is important for maintaining
experimental control over the social cognitive processes studied
in an experiment, such experimental constrictions can result
in artificially constrained understandings of the social cognitive
processes involved. There is a need to emphasize dynamic stimuli
that reflect real-life interactions in which participants react to
dynamic stimuli in an interactive way that modifies subsequent
dynamic stimuli. An unfortunate limitation of many social
neuroscience approaches is that the participant is presented
static and controlled stimuli that lead the participant to believe
and act ‘‘as if’’ the participant could modify the course of a
social interaction. As such, many current social neuroscience
approaches do not include real-time dynamic and adaptive
virtual agents with complex cognitive architectures (Faur et al.,
2013). Although advances in technologies now allow dynamic
interactions with intelligent virtual agents, many constraints on
experimental designs and subsequent statistical analyses often
restrict the stimuli to more traditional approaches.
Contextualized succession of events
In addition to multimodal and dynamic stimuli, ecologically
valid social neuroscience paradigms also involve the
contextualized succession of events that are intuitively clear
when associated within a sequence. While many social
neuroscience approaches use various stimulus approaches
(comic-strips, video-based mental state inferences) to depict
an agent performing actions following a specific schema, they
often do not promote a context that will prompt the participant
to have an invested interest in this agent. Without adequate
social context, the participant may not enter experience an
empathetic relationship with the agent. Further, given the
assumption that social interaction may be experienced as
motivating and rewarding, social neuroscience approaches
should implement a social context that allows for assessment of
motivations to interact socially. Social neuroscience experiments
place participants in a scanner and instruct them to fixate on
stimuli presented on a monitor. Neuroimaging resulting from
such studies appears to be significantly dissimilar to studies
in which the participant is performing such tasks together
with another agent. The addition of another agent results in a
differential increase of neural activity in brain areas that have
been related to grasping another’s mental states (Schilbach et al.,
2008).
Social interactions found in everyday exchanges
The social interactions found in everyday exchanges involve
a broad array of contexts, including verbal and nonverbal
interactions, interpretation of others, representations of self
and other, and joint attention. In order to understand social
interactions, social neurosciences should have the methods
necessary for assessing self-understanding, self and other
interactions, and relations between self and other in everyday
environments (Sebanz et al., 2006; Schilbach et al., 2013). An
unfortunate limitation for many social neuroscience approaches
is that they study a single participant’s brain in isolation
instead of during real-world interactions (Tanabek et al.,
2012). For example, participants are often isolated from their
natural environments and placed into a sealed room where the
participant is exposed to static images, auditory stimuli, and/or
video clips. Social neuroscientists have designed a number of
innovative paradigms to investigate the neural bases of various
aspects of social interactions: (1) the participant views video clips
and/or pre-recorded interactions (Iacoboni et al., 2004; Walter
et al., 2004); (2) the participant takes part in an online game
(e.g., Cyberball) with an avatar that is playing catch with two
other avatars (Lieberman and Eisenberger, 2009; Eisenberger,
2012); or (3) the participant views a noninteractive virtual human
that shifts gaze towards or away from the participant (Pelphrey
et al., 2003, 2004). While these methodological approaches
afford significant information related to the potential neural
underpinnings of social interaction, they are missing essential
mechanisms of everyday social interactions (Hari and Kujala,
2009). The difficulties in either developing laboratory controlled
experiments or naturalistic interactions between two participants
are apparent in fMRI studies (Montague et al., 2002).
In summary, the social interactions found in everyday
exchanges involve a broad array of contexts, including verbal and
nonverbal interactions, interpretation of others, representations
of self and other, and shared attention. In order to understand
social interactions, it is important that social neurosciences
have the methods necessary for assessing self-understanding,
self and other interactions, and relations between self and
other in everyday environments (Sebanz et al., 2006; Schilbach
et al., 2013). An unfortunate limitation of social neuroscience
assessments is that it is difficult to generate study findings that
can generalize beyond the narrow laboratory context. Many
of the pioneering paradigms in social neuroscience involve
observing static stimuli (e.g., simple, static representations of
socially relevant stimuli; static photographs of emotionally
valenced facial expressions) that are devoid of interactions.While
there are a number of innovative paradigms to investigate the
neural bases of various aspects of social interactions, they are
missing essential mechanisms of everyday social interactions.
Virtual Reality for Enhanced Ecological
Validity and Experimental Control
Given that virtual environments represent a special case of
computerized neuropsychological assessment devices (Bauer
et al., 2012) they have enhanced computational capacities
for administration efficiency, stimulus presentation, automated
logging of responses, and data analytic processing. This greater
computation power results in enhanced capacity for generating
perceptual environments that systematically present and record
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neurobehavioral responses to dynamic stimuli. Advances in
virtual environment technology offer platforms in which three-
dimensional objects are presented in a dynamic, consistent, and
precise manner. A virtual environment provides the researcher
with an ecologically valid platform for presenting dynamic
stimuli in a manner that allows for both the veridical control
of laboratory measures and the verisimilitude of naturalistic
observation of real life situations (Matheis et al., 2007; Jovanovski
et al., 2012a,b). Virtual environment-based assessments can
provide a balance between naturalistic observation and the
need for exacting control over key variables (Campbell et al.,
2009).
Virtual environments allow researchers to immerse
participants in simulations that produce a sense or presence
(e.g., ‘‘being there’’). The ideas of presence and immersion
have been explicated by Rebelo et al. (2012) as key concepts
to understanding the psychological and physical experiences
of participants using. They describe immersion as being
characterized by the participant’s perception of being inserted
into an environment, while being directly connected to the
virtual surroundings and the sensations (e.g., visual, auditory,
haptic) and feelings that result. As such, ‘‘presence’’ is connected
to the psychological features involved and is confirmed in the
sensations (visual, auditory, haptic) activated in the participant’s
relationship with the virtual environment.
While there are a number of advantages inherent in virtual
environments, there are some drawbacks that researchers should
consider when they are contemplating the adoption of virtual
environments for their studies: cost, bulkiness of equipment,
simulator sickness, specialist technology skills, and psychometric
validation. Cost has long been a barrier to incorporating
advanced virtual environments.While a wide-field-of-view head-
mounted display with tracking capabilities can cost thousands of
dollars, computer equipment setups are rapidly decreasing in size
and price—with a concomitant increase in computational power
and ease of operation. Further, these systems have historically
been bulky HMD helmets that engulfed the user’s entire head
and face, and weighed several pounds. Given progress in the
design of HMDs, these problems have steadily diminished.
For example, the Oculus Rift (Oculus, USA) is a new and
light weight (380g) head mounted display that only costs a
few hundred dollars (i.e., $300) and it proffers an extended
field of view of 110 degrees, stereoscopic vision, and rapid
head tracking. The Oculus Rift has advanced data processing
of stimuli that comes through 3-axis gyroscope, accelerometer,
and magnetometer, giving the user a fast image update with
greatly limited delay. Nevertheless, simulator sickness continues
to be a potential issue for some users. Simulator sickness is
typically understood as nausea resulting from the incongruity
between visual perception of motion and vestibular feedback
that is not matched by vision (Kennedy et al., 2000; Keshavarz
and Hecht, 2011). Another issue that is commonly raised is
the need for technology skills for creation and maintaining
virtual environments. This issue is becoming less formidable
as increasingly powerful tools are becoming available. In
addition to the fact that many of these tools are free to users
(e.g., Unreal, Unity, Source 2), large repositories of graphic
assets are increasingly available for use in user friendly visual
programming and scripting languages (e.g., Virtools andVizard).
A final concern for researchers wanting to incorporate virtual
environments is that of psychometric validity. While a number
of studies have attempted to establish the validity of these
environments via comparisons with well-established paper-
and-pencil as well as computer automated platforms, results
reveal the need for judicious use of these virtual platforms.
Researcher must carefully judge the degree to which the
virtual environments offer something beyond less expensive
and modalities that are free from technological and simulator
sickness issues.
In summary, virtual environment-based assessments allow
for real-time assessment of a participant’s clinical, affective, and
social processing in a manner that more closely resembles real-
world functional abilities (Parsey and Schmitter-Edgecombe,
2013). While many of the limitations inherent in virtual
environment technology have been addressed via advances in
technology, researchers need to consider the potential remaining
limitations (e.g., simulator sickness for some cohorts and
validation) before incorporating them into an experimental
paradigm. In the following, there will be a description of
the potential of virtual reality for precise presentation and
control of dynamic perceptual stimuli that can be used for
assessment of neurocognitive, affective, and social processing
while participants are immersed in simulations of real world
contexts. Further, there will be a discussion of both strengths and
potential limitations of some virtual environments.
Virtual environments for clinical neuroscience
A difficulty for most neuropsychological assessments is that
performance on tests (e.g., WCST; Stroop task) of a given
construct (e.g., working memory) may have little or no
predictive value for how a person functions in a real world
situation (Chaytor et al., 2006). Neuropsychologists are more
and more emphasizing the need for tasks that represent
real world functioning and tap into a number of cognitive
domains (Chaytor and Schmitter-Edgecombe, 2003). Virtual
environments are increasingly considered as potential aids
in enhancing the ecological validity of neuropsychological
assessments (Campbell et al., 2009; Renison et al., 2012). While
early virtual reality equipment suffered a number of limitations
(large and unwieldy, difficulty to operate, and expensive to
develop and maintain), today’s virtual environment systems
are more reliable, cost effective, and acceptable in terms of
size and appearance (Bohil et al., 2011). In this section, both
construct-driven and function-led virtual environments will be
discussed. First, given this review’s emphasis upon the need
for function-led assessments for ecological validity, there will
be a discussion of early virtual environments that focused on
automating paper-and-pencil version of construct driven tests
(e.g., WCST). While these early environments were novel in
their approach, they added little to paper-and-pencil assessments
and suffered the limits of the paper-and-pencil analogs. Next,
newer construct-driven virtual environments are presented that
have the advantage of distractors for increasing ecological
validity. Unfortunately, the addition of distractors does little
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to increase ecological validity or move beyond paper-and-
pencil approaches. Finally, function-led virtual environments
will be described that greatly enhance ecological validity via
an emphasis proceeding from directly observable everyday
behaviors and moving backward to examine the ways in which
a sequence of actions leads to a given behavior in normal
functioning.
Virtual environments with construct driven veridicality
assessments
Early virtual environments attempted to build upon the
construct-driven neuropsychological assessments found in
traditional paper-and-pencil assessments. For example, a
number of early virtual environments aimed to build upon
the WCST paradigm, in which participants navigated to the
exit of a virtual building through the matching of stimuli to
environmental cues (e.g., categories of shape, color, and number
of portholes) found on virtual doors (Pugnetti et al., 1995, 1998).
A notable limitation of these early virtual environment was a
heavy reliance on navigating through a building and this may
have confounded the results. In a novel and evolved iteration,
the Virtual Reality Look for a Match (VRLFAM) test removed
the navigational components and immersed the participant in
a virtual beach scene. Participants were instructed to deliver
frisbees, sodas, popsicles, and beach balls to umbrellas (Elkind
et al., 2001). While these virtual environments were innovative
approaches, an unfortunate limitation of modeling virtual
environment-based neuropsychological assessments off of the
WCST is that the virtual analogs, like the original WCST, may
not be able to differentiate between patients with frontal lobe
pathology and control subjects (Stuss et al., 1983).
Virtual environment-based distractors to enhance construct
driven tests
A more recent approach to developing virtual environments
has involved the addition of ecologically valid distractors (e.g.,
phone ringing, car driving by) to construct-driven stimuli
(e.g., Stroop stimuli) presented in the virtual environment. For
example, the Virtual Apartment presents Stroop stimuli on
a large television set in the living room while the phone is
ringing (Henry et al., 2012). The addition of distractors into
the virtual environment allows traditional cognitive constructs
to be assessed with external interference and the distracters
(auditory and/or visual elements). Virtual environment-based
distracters pull for head movements that allow a better detection
of subtle deficits (Henry et al., 2012). As a result, a main
advantage of these virtual environments is that they allow
the researcher to introduce distractors into a task that is
more similar to the real world functioning. A number of
virtual classroom environments have emerged that include
distractors (Climent and Bánterla, 2011; Iriarte et al., 2012;
Lalonde et al., 2013; Díaz-Orueta et al., 2014). In these virtual
classrooms the participant is seated at one of the desks and is
surrounded by desks, children, a teacher, and a white board
much like they would be in a real-world classroom. Various
construct driven tasks can be presented on the whiteboard in
the front of the room and the participant performs a task
(e.g., Stroop or continuous performance tasks, CPTs) with
auditory (e.g., airplane passing overhead, a voice from the
intercom, the bell ringing) and visual (e.g., children passing
notes, a child raising his hand, the teacher answering the
classroom door, principal entering the room) distractors in the
background.
In a clinical trial of a Virtual Classroom with an embedded
CPT, Parsons et al. (2007) compared performance of children
with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD;N = 9) with
typically developing children (N = 10). In this study, children
with ADHD performed differently from typically developing
children in a number of different ways: (1) children with ADHD
made more commission and omission errors; (2) children
with ADHD exhibited more overall body movement; and
(3) children with ADHD were more impacted by distracting
stimuli. Comparison of children with ADHD and matched
controls using the Virtual Classroom CPT and the traditional
CPT have revealed consistent findings (Adams et al., 2009;
Pollak et al., 2010; Bioulac et al., 2012). A limitation of these
studies is that the Virtual Classroom CPT simply replicated
effects found in the traditional Conner’s CPT. As a result,
the Virtual Classroom did not add to our understanding
attentional processing. That said, the Parsons et al. (2007)
study using the Virtual Classroom paradigm allowed for
tracking of body movement and revealed that the addition of
distractors increased body movement significantly more in the
children with ADHD. The ability of the Virtual Classroom
to quantify body movement represents a potential advance
over subjective rating scales for identification of hyperactivity.
Nevertheless, there is need for virtual environment measures
that do more than correlate with traditional construct-driven
measures.
Virtual environments designed for use as function-led
assessments
In the clinical neurosciences there is increasing interest in
neuropsychological assessments that are representative of real-
world functions. These function-led assessments are developed
by proceeding from directly observable everyday behaviors
backward to examine the ways in which a sequence of actions
leads to a given behavior in normal functioning. While a
number of function-led assessments in naturalistic environments
have been developed, they face a number of limitations: time
consuming, require transportation to the location, involve
consent from local businesses, costly, and difficult to replicate or
standardize across settings (Rand et al., 2009; Logie et al., 2011).
Further, there are times when function-led assessments in real-
world settings are not feasible for participants with significant
behavioral, psychiatric, or mobility difficulties (Knight et al.,
2002). To overcome some of these concerns, McGeorge et al.
(2001) modeled a Virtual Errands Test (VET) off of the
original MET and found performance was similar for real-
world and virtual environment tasks. In a larger study, the VET
scenario successfully differentiated between participants with
brain injuries and normal controls (Morris et al., 2002). An
unfortunate limitation of these early virtual environments is that
they included unrealistic graphics without event-based logging.
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Instead, assessment of performance involved the video recording
of test sessions with subsequent manual scoring.
Virtual environments that reflect real-world tasks
A number of newer virtual environments with realistic graphics
and event-based logging have been modeled off of the MET.
These function-led virtual environments have been created
and validated in clinical samples. Given that these virtual
environment protocols were developed by proceeding from
directly observable everyday behaviors backward they examine
the ways in which a sequence of actions leads to a given behavior
in living and work settings: Virtual Office (Lamberts et al.,
2009; Montgomery et al., 2011; Jansari et al., 2013); Virtual
Apartment/Home tasks (Sweeney et al., 2010); Virtual Park
(Buxbaum et al., 2012); Virtual Library Task (VLT; Renison
et al., 2012); Virtual Anticipating Consequences Task (Cook
et al., 2013); Virtual Street Crossing (Clancy et al., 2010); and
Virtual Kitchen (Cao et al., 2010). Further, there are a number of
virtual environment-based neuropsychological assessments that
use driving simulators (Schultheis et al., 2007; Asimakopulos
et al., 2012; Calhoun and Pearlson, 2012).
While there are a number of virtual environments available
for function-led assessment, the Multitasking in the City Test
(MCT) is especially useful because it involves an errand-
running task implemented in a virtual city (Jovanovski et al.,
2012a,b). The MCT is made up of a virtual city that includes
a post office, drug store, stationary store, coffee shop, grocery
store, optometrist’s office, doctor’s office, restaurant/pub, bank,
dry cleaners, pet store, and the participant’s home. While
immersed in the MCT, participants are assessed on their
planning ability, self-monitoring, multitasking, prioritization of
competing subtasks, and utilization of feedback to guide decision
making. The MCT errands consisted of everyday tasks such
as meeting deadlines, making purchases, and staying within a
budget. While the MCT is modelled off the real-world MET,
it differs in that the MCT intentionally was developed with
as a less structured task without the explicit rules that may
constrain behavior in the MET. Instead, the MCT tasks were
developed to more closely resemble everyday behaviors. Further,
unlike most versions of the MET that have no opportunity to
plan tasks ahead of time, planning in the MET is assessed and
compared to actual task performance. In a study with 30 healthy
participants, Jovanovski et al. (2012a) found that the MCT may
provide an ecologically valid method of objectively evaluating the
integration of component executive functions into meaningful
behavior. This represents a departure from traditional paper-
and-pencil measures that aim to assesses cognitive constructs
(e.g., working memory) without reference to real-world settings.
Further, using the MCT researchers were able to compare a
sample of post-stroke and traumatic brain injury (TBI) patients
to an earlier sample of normal controls. Jovanovski et al. (2012b)
found that while participants in the clinical sample were able
to develop adequate strategies for task execution, the actual
completion of the tasks revealed a greater number of errors. The
MCT’s capacity for assessing subprocesses not tapped into by
traditional measures is apparent in that most participants made
errors during the MCT despite having successfully completing
all tasks. For example, participants often attempted to make a
purchase before obtaining money from the bank, they entered
a building but failed to perform the required task within the
building, entered the same building on two separate occasions
to perform two tasks that could have been performed in a single
visit, and entered unnecessary buildings. Participants were also
evaluated on their devising of which route they would take to
complete errands around the city prior to task initiation. These
findings move beyond paper-and-pencil measures and highlight
the importance of prior planning for efficient and successful goal-
directed behavior.
Comparison of real-world assessments to virtual-world
assessments
A further example of function-led virtual environments is the
VLT. During the VLT, participants are required to perform
numerous indicated tasks associated with the day to day running
of the library, while observing predetermined rules: cool the
library navigating to the air conditioner adjusting the controls;
problem solve an alternative method to cool the room if the
air conditioner is broken, check items that appear in the in-
box; and move objects to desired locations. Renison et al.
(2012) aimed to investigate whether performance on a VLT was
similar to performance of the same task in a real-world library.
Findings revealed that scores on the VLT and the real world
library task were highly positively correlated, suggesting that
performance on the VLT is similar to performance on the real
world library task. This finding is important because the virtual
reality environment allows for automated logging of participant
behaviors and it has greater clinical utility than assessment
in real world settings. Comparisons of persons with TBI and
normal controls supported the construct validity of the VLT as
a measure of executive functioning. In fact, the VLT was found
to be superior to traditional (e.g., WCST) tasks in differentiating
between participants with TBI and healthy controls. For example,
the WCST failed to significantly differentiate between the two
groups. This is consistent with studies that have reported
no significant differences between control and brain injured
performances on the WCST (Alderman et al., 2003; Dawson
et al., 2009; Ord et al., 2010). The authors contend that the
disparity between the demands of functional assessments and
traditional testing environments most likely accounts for the
differences (Manchester et al., 2004).
In summary, a number of researchers have emphasized
convergent validity between construct-driven virtual
environments and paper-and-pencil assessments. That said, little
is gained from the use of virtual environments when a paper-
and-pencil measure can already answer the neuropsychologists
questions. The inclusion of distractors in construct driven
virtual environments may enhance the ability to quantify
body movement and perhaps diagnosis of ‘‘hyperactivity’’
in ADHD. However, this addition may not be enough to
compel neuropsychologists to adopt new technologies. Greater
enthusiasm is apparent for function led virtual environments that
were developed by proceeding from directly observable everyday
behaviors backward to examine the ways in which a sequence
of actions leads to a given behavior in normal functioning.
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While these virtual reality-based function led assessments
are at times correlated with traditional neuropsychological
assessments, the most promising results have come from the
increased understandings of the ways in which persons interact
in everyday activities. They represent ecologically valid tasks
that assess cognition and include the demands that participants
face in the real world. It is important to note that the function
led assessments need not replace tradition neuropsychological
batteries. Instead, function-led virtual environment-based tests
may be seen as an addition to current batteries. These virtual
environments may allow for increased knowledge of competence
in everyday functioning.
Virtual Environments for Affective Assessments
In addition to the cognitive processing assessments mentioned
above, virtual environments are also being used to assess affective
processes. Virtual reality has recently become an increasingly
popular medium for assessment of various aspects of affective
arousal and emotional dysregulation (Parsons and Rizzo, 2008).
Virtual environments can be used when real-world exposure
would be too costly, time consuming, or hazardous. It has
been found to be an especially useful modality for assessing
psychophysiological and behavioral responses of participants
(Fahrenberg et al., 2007; Betella et al., 2014). In the following,
a number of application areas for affective arousal using virtual
environments are discussed: general fear conditioning; affective
responses in everyday contexts; affective responses in threatening
contexts; and affective processing ofmoral dilemmas. These areas
were chosen because they cover the range of contexts for affective
responding from simple fear conditioning to real world moral
dilemmas.
Virtual environments for studies of fear conditioning
One application of interest for affective neuroscience is the
use of virtual environments for studies of fear conditioning
(Alvarez et al., 2007; Baas et al., 2008). Virtual environments
offer an ecologically valid platform for examinations of context-
dependent fear reactions in simulations of real-life activities
(Mühlberger et al., 2007; Glotzbach et al., 2012). Neuroimaging
studies utilizing virtual environments have been used to delineate
brain circuits involved in sustained anxiety to unpredictable
stressors in humans. In a study of contextual fear conditioning
Alvarez et al. (2008) used a Virtual Office and fMRI to investigate
whether the same brain mechanisms that underlie contextual
fear conditioning in animals are also found in humans. Results
suggested that contextual fear conditioning in humans were
consistent with preclinical findings in rodents. Specifically,
findings support Hot affective processing in that the medial
aspect of the amygdala had afferent and efferent connections that
included input from the orbitofrontal cortex. In another study
using a Virtual Office, Glotzbach-Schoon et al. (2013) assessed
the modulation of contextual fear conditioning and extinction by
5HTTLPR (serotonin-transporter-linked polymorphic region)
and NPSR1 (neuropeptide S receptor 1) polymorphisms. Results
revealed that both the 5HTTLPR and the NPSR1 polymorphisms
were related to Hot affective (implicit) processing via a fear
potentiated startle. There was no effect of the 5HTTLPR
polymorphism on Cold cognitive (explicit) ratings of anxiety.
Given the ability of virtual environments to place participants
in experimentally controlled yet contextually relevant situations,
there appears to be promise in applying this platform to future
translational studies into contextual fear conditioning.
Virtual environments to elicit affective responses in everyday
contexts
The use of virtual environments has also been used to elicit
affective responses in everyday contexts. For example, Riva
et al. (2007) manipulated virtual parks to elicit affective arousal.
All participants experienced anxious, relaxing and neutral
parks. Although all the same structure was found in all three
parks, the parks differed in the aural and visual experience
that was presented to the participant. Findings suggested that
the three affective park presentations (anxious and relaxing)
have some efficacy for eliciting specific emotional states. In
related studies virtual environments have successfully elicited
heightened affective arousal in a virtual train (Freeman et al.,
2008) and a virtual office (Roy et al., 2003; Klinger et al.,
2005). These results suggest that virtual environments can be
used as an affect induction medium. In another virtual office
scenario participants were immersed in a virtual office scenario
designed to elicit anger (Macedonio et al., 2007). Within a
few seconds of starting the virtual environment, a virtual boss
approaches and verbally confronts the participant in a hostile
and condescending fashion. The study found physiological
correlates of anger arousal stimuli from a virtual environment.
In a more fully developed study Mühlberger et al. (2008)
matched arousal events in a Virtual Tunnel driving experiment
with startle reflex methodology to investigate whether the
phylogenetically relevant aversive context of darkness elicited
fear responses. Results revealed increased negative affect during
darker areas of the virtual tunnel. The increased logging
abilities of these virtual environments allow for matching
psychophysiological responses to events as they occur in the
simulations.
Virtual environments to elicit affective responses
in threatening contexts
Recently, virtual environments have been applied to the
assessment of both ‘‘Cold’’ and ‘‘Hot’’ processes using combat
related scenarios (Armstrong et al., 2013; Parsons et al.,
2013). The addition of virtual environments allows affective
neuroscience researchers to move beyond the ethical concerns
related to placing participants into real-world situations with
hazardous contexts. The goal of these platforms is to assess the
impact of Hot affective arousal upon Cold cognitive processes.
For example, Parsons et al. (2013) have developed a Virtual
Reality Stroop Task (VRST) in which the participant is immersed
in a simulated High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV) and passes through zones with alternating low
threat (driving down a deserted desert road) and high threat
(gunfire, explosions, and shouting amongst other stressors) while
dual-task stimuli (e.g., Stroop stimuli) were presented on the
windshield. They found that the high-threat zones created a
greater level of psychophysiological arousal (heart rate, skin
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conductance, respiration) than did low threat zones. Findings
from these studies also provided data regarding the potential
of military relevant virtual environments for measurement
of supervisory attentional processing (Parsons et al., 2013).
Analyses of the effect of threat level on the color–word and
interference scores resulted in a main effect of threat level and
condition. Findings from the virtual environment paradigm
support the perspective that: (1) high information load tasks
used for Cold cognitive processing may be relatively automatic in
controlled circumstances—for example, in low threat zones with
little activity; and (2) the total available processing capacities may
be decreased by other Hot affective factors such as arousal (e.g.,
threat zones with a great deal of activity). In a replication study,
Armstrong et al. (2013) established the preliminary convergent
and discriminant validity of the VRST with an active duty
military sample.
In addition to virtual environment-based neuropsychological
assessments using driving simulators, a number of other military
relevant virtual environments have emerged for neurocogntive
assessment of Cold and Hot processes. For example, (Parsons
et al., 2012; Parsons and Courtney, 2014) immersed participants
into a Middle Eastern city and exposed participants to a Cold
cognitive processing task (e.g., paced auditory serial addition
test) as they followed a fire team on foot through safe and
ambush (e.g., Hot affective—bombs, gunfire, screams and other
visual and auditory forms of threat) zones in a Middle Eastern
city. In one measure of the battery, a route-learning task,
each zone is preceded by a zone marker, which serves as
a landmark to assist in remembering the route. The route-
learning task is followed immediately by the navigation task
in which the participants were asked to return to the starting
point of their tour through the city. Courtney et al. (2013)
found that the inclusion of Hot affective stimuli (e.g., high-
threat zones) resulted in a greater level of psychophysiological
arousal (heart rate, skin conductance, respiration) and decreased
performance on Cold cognitive processes than did low threat
zones. Results from active duty military (Parsons et al., 2012)
and civilian (Parsons and Courtney, 2014) populations offer
preliminary support for the construct validity of the VR-PASAT
as a measure of attentional processing. Further, results suggest
that the VR-PASAT may provide some unique information
related to Hot affective processing not tapped by traditional Cold
attentional processing tasks.
Virtual reality-based moral dilemmas
Virtual environments are also being applied to the affective
neuroscience of moral decision making. Recently studies have
emerged that take the classic Trolley Dilemma and modify
the text-based approach via a Virtual Trolley Dilemma (Pan
and Slater, 2011; Navarrete et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2014;
Skulmowski et al., 2014). Further, while text-based hypothetical
moral dilemmas led to gaps in our understanding of how
results translate into real-world behaviors, virtual environments
allow for observations of morally relevant decision making
behaviors in realistic three-dimensional simulations.With virtual
environments, researchers can perform real-time assessment of
the cognitive and affective factors inherent in explicit moral
behaviors. Patil et al. (2014) compared traditional text-based
approaches to a virtual environment version of the trolley
dilemma. They found a modality specific difference in that
participant behavior in the virtual environment reflected a
utilitarian approach, but in the text-based descriptions the same
moral dilemmas resulted in nonutilitarian decisions. Further,
autonomic arousal was greater in virtual environments. These
differences suggest that text-based scenario presentation does
not include dynamic visual information that is available to
persons in real-world environments. With virtual environments
there appears to be enhanced capacity for the context-dependent
knowledge that is critical for moral decision making.
Navarrete et al. (2012) used virtual environments to observe
behaviors and record autonomic arousal of participants as
they confronted moral dilemmas. Specifically, they immersed
participants into a virtual reality version of the trolley problem.
Participants were given the choice of whether or not to pull a
lever that would determine the fate (e.g., death or safety) of some
number of people. The virtual environment included virtual
human agents that were capable of movement and sound in real
time. Validity of the virtual trolley paradigm was apparent in that
results were consistent with the behavioral pattern observed in
studies using text versions of the trolley dilemma. Results also
revealed that affective arousal was: (1) associated with a reduced
likelihood that participants were acting to achieve a utilitarian
outcome; and (2) greater when participants were attempting to
behaviorally resolve a dilemma that required committing an act
than when participants were omitting an action. An important
aspect of these findings is that they provide support for a relation
between Hot affective processing and moral action. These
findings also suggest that similar neurophysiological processes
may mediate Cold processing of moral judgments and actions.
Virtual environment based moral dilemmas appear to offer an
empirical platform for investigating the contents and contexts in
which Hot affective and Cold cognitive processing occur.
In a study that builds on Navarrete et al.’s (2012) paradigm,
Skulmowski et al. (2014) developed a virtual reality-based
trolley dilemma that utilized a first person perspective of
the forced-choice decision-making paradigm. A novel aspect
of the Skulmowski design is that the participants were the
drivers of the train. This approach was chosen because research
on presence and immersion in virtual environments has
found that first-person perspectives elicit a greater sense of
presence and involvement (Kallinen et al., 2007; Slater et al.,
2010). The study also included psychophysiological assessment
metrics drawn from pupillometry that were integrated into the
virtual environment paradigm. Like Navarrete et al.’s virtual
trolley study, Skulmowski’s experiment replicated the behavioral
pattern found in studies using text-based versions of the trolley
dilemma. This further validated the use of the virtual trolley
platform for research on moral decision making. Additional
findings included a peak in the level of arousal related to the
moment that the moral decision was made. Further, eye-tracking
revealed context-dependent gaze durations during decisions to
sacrifice. These findings comport well with dual-process theories.
Since decision time frames were able to be held constant in
the virtual environment paradigm, events could be logged and
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marked for comparison to pupillometric measurements. This
approach offers promise for moving beyond paper-and-pencil
(e.g., text-based) approaches in which participants read scenario
descriptions at varying speeds.
In summary, mere judgments about moral dilemmas results
in a limited understanding. The hypothetical and text based
vignettes attempt to stimulate the imagination of participants
and then use questionnaires or experiments involving low-
level manipulations of harm to enhance understanding. The
addition of virtual environments allows researchers to assess the
expression of decision making processes via real time logging of
behaviors. Given that virtual environments are more dynamic
than text based scenarios and that they do not involve the
potential for harmful outcomes, they may bridge the gap between
judgment and behavior via explorations of the underlying
mechanisms. While the virtual environment approach does
not offer a definitive solution to the long-standing trade-off
between laboratory control and real world behaviors, it does
allow researchers a methodology for presenting participants with
auditory and visual representations of real-world activities.
Virtual Environments for Social Neurosciences
In recent years there has been an increased interest in
the application of neuropsychological and neuroscientific
methodologies to research in contemporary social psychology
(Lieberman et al., 2007; Adolphs, 2009, 2010). Although
cognitive neuroscience has made gains in the exploration of
the brain systems engaged when an individual shares and
makes inferences about the internal states of others, they
have emphasized isolation paradigms, that rely on participant
observations of others behaviors and to make inferences about
the mental states of others (Becchio et al., 2010). Recently, there
has been a call to move from the third person mentalizing
approach to a second person neuroscience that involves social
interaction (Schilbach et al., 2013). Furthermore, researchers
from the cognitive neurosciences typically use divergent and
highly simplified stimuli and methods. As a result, research
drawn from cognitive neuroscience studies using a strictly
laboratory focused approach have produced largely non-
overlapping results and artificially constrained social theories
(Zaki and Ochsner, 2009). While many of the pioneering
paradigms in social neuroscience have used static stimuli to
study social cognition in everyday activities, a number of
researchers are beginning to question this approach (Schilbach
et al., 2006; Risko et al., 2012; Chakrabarti, 2013). While
video recordings, movies, and imagery techniques have been
used by social neuroscientists to elicit emotions (Zaki and
Ochsner, 2009), enhanced ecological approaches increase the
capacity to manipulate the content of interactive media to
induce specific emotional responses. As Neisser (1980) argued,
participants observing video-recordings of others, and then
making judgments of what they saw miss an important
interactive component that occurs in a social exchange. Virtual
environments offer the social neuroscientist the ability to
induce a feeling of presence in participants as they experience
emotionally engaging background narratives to enhance affective
experience and social interactions (Gorini et al., 2011; Diemer
et al., 2015). Recently, social neuroscientists have started
incorporating virtual reality into their experiments and are
increasingly using virtual-reality stimuli in social neuroscience
research (Adolphs, 2003; Wilms et al., 2010; Schilbach et al.,
2013). In addition to advanced presentation of dynamic stimuli,
virtual environments allow for moment by moment logging
of interactive scenarios that comport well with the constraints
of neuroimaging settings. As such, virtual environments
offer promise for advancing the investigation of the neural
underpinnings of joint actions (Schilbach et al., 2006, 2010;
Newman-Norlund et al., 2008; Kokal et al., 2009; Pfeiffer et al.,
2013). With advances in simulation technologies, the trade-off
between the experimental control found in the laboratory and the
ecological validity of naturalistic observation may be alleviated,
as virtual technology can be modified and adapted without
compromising measurement control (Bohil et al., 2011).
Neural underpinnings involved in interpreting others
A number of studies have emerged using virtual reality,
psychophysiology, and neuroimaging of brain activity during
naturalistic, face-to-face social interactions. These studies have
aided the identification of brain regions involved in interpreting
others’ face and eye movements. When participants were
approached by a virtual human exhibiting an angry expression,
researchers found activation of the superior temporal sulcus,
the lateral fusiform gyrus, and a region of the middle temporal
gyrus (Carter and Pelphrey, 2008). In other eye-gaze paradigms,
(Schilbach et al., 2006, 2010) characterized the neural correlates
of being involved in social interactions through the introduction
of dynamic virtual humans in the scanner. The virtual humans
were programmed to ‘‘gaze at’’ and ‘‘greet others.’’ The ‘‘others’’
were lying passively in a scanner or a bystander. Findings
revealed that the vmPFC underpins the perception of social
communication and feeling of personal involvement (Schilbach
et al., 2006). Further, when the participants initiated shared
attention with the virtual humans, neural activity increased in
the ventral striatum (Schilbach et al., 2010). In a related study,
Wilms et al. (2010) instructed participants in the scanner to
‘‘respond to’’ or ‘‘probe’’ the gaze of a virtual human that was
being operated by another human. They were not told that the
virtual human was in fact being operated by a computer. The
goal of the participants was to establish eye contact with the
virtual human and to attend jointly to one of three objects on
a screen. The participants were instructed that the three objects
represented the participant’s eye-gaze. This approach allowed
for the investigation of neural differences between successful
initiation of joint attention and mere gaze following. A main
effect was found for joint attention resulting in the activation of
the medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and the
anterior temporal poles.
Virtual interactions using cyberball
Social neuroscientists have also started using the virtual gaming
task called Cyberball to induce social exclusion in participants.
A number of researchers have used the Cyberball game as
an experimentally controlled social exclusion assessment that
elicits affective (Williams, 2007; Wesselmann et al., 2012),
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neurobiological (Eisenberger, 2012), psychophysiological
(Gunther Moor et al., 2010; Sijtsema et al., 2011), and hormonal
(Geniole et al., 2011; Zwolinski, 2012) responses. Throughout the
Cyberball task, the participant is represented by an avatar that
is playing catch with two other avatars. The two other avatars
ostensibly represent two other human participants. Participants
are either included or ostracized during the Cyberball tossing
game by two or three other players who are, in fact, controlled
by an experimenter. The virtual Cyberball game starts with
each avatar catching and throwing a ball (each about a third
of the time). During the ‘‘inclusion’’ condition, the participant
continues to catch and throw the ball about a third of the
time. However, during the ‘‘exclusion’’ condition, the other two
avatars throw the ball back and forth and ignore (neither avatar
looks at or throws the ball to) the participant. It is interesting
to note that telling participants that the avatars in the Cyberball
game are controlled by a computer does not change the effects
of ostracism. In fact, the ostracism delivered by computers was
judged by participants to be just as unpleasant as ostracism by
humans. Further, it did not matter to participants whether the
human controlled or computer controlled players had a choice
as to whom they threw the ball (Zadro et al., 2004).
The use of the Cyberball game in ostracism research is
expedient because it allows for flexibility modification for study
of group interactions without the use of live confederates, to
collect large samples over the Internet, and for neuroimaging
studies. Recent results from neuroimaging studies have revealed
that the experience of being excluded from ball-tossing reliably
evokes increased activation of the dorsal anterior cingulate and
anterior insula which correlates with self-reports of physical
pain (Eisenberger, 2012). A number of qualitative reviews of the
fMRI and Cyberball social exclusion literature have emerged and
all have concluded that nociceptive stimuli and social rejection
both activate this physical pain matrix. Although the results
from a recent meta-analysis suggest that the neural correlates
of nociceptive stimuli and social rejection have some distinct
patterns of activation, they still share commonalities (Cacioppo
et al., 2013). In a more recent meta-analysis, Rotge et al. (2014)
found that the Cyberball task activated the dorsal anterior
cingulate circuit less than other experimental social pain tasks.
These findings are consistent with the suggestion that the social
pain that follows from Cyberball is less intense than the social
pain that follows from more personal forms of social rejection
(Eisenberger, 2015).
While the Cyberball paradigm has been widely used, some of
the less robust findings may reflect the fact that early versions
of the Cyberball task lacked the everyday realism and ecological
validity that are now available in today’s immersive virtual
environments. A recent advance in the Cyberball paradigm
is an immersive virtual environment version that places the
participant into a virtual environment with interactive virtual
humans (Kassner et al., 2012). Results revealed that the more
immersive virtual environments induced feelings of ostracism
in participants. In addition to prompting feelings of ostracism
that are consistent with negative effects found in minimalist
environments, the immersive virtual environment effect sizes
were medium to large in magnitude. In addition to these robust
effects, the immersive virtual environment Cyberball paradigm
offers researchers the ability to control aspects (proxemics and
non-verbal communication) of the social context that cannot be
accomplished in minimalist ostracism paradigms. The inclusion
of immersive virtual environments in Cyberball paradigms
may allow for enhanced flexibility in manipulation of social
information about the confederates’ avatars, virtual humans,
and/or their behaviors (Wirth et al., 2011). Further, the inclusion
of virtual humans enhances the Cyberball paradigm because it
allows for additional social information such as non-verbal (e.g.,
eye-gaze) information that has been found to convey ostracism
(Wirth et al., 2010).
Virtual representations of self and other
Embodiment accounts of social cognition that emphasize shared
bodily representations for self and other may be aided by the
use of virtual reality technology. Given that immersive virtual
environments involve flexible computer platforms, the shape,
form, size, or type of a virtual human body can be manipulated
to represent something divergent from the participant’s actual
body. This flexibility of the virtual environment and the
virtual human bodies can influence the participant’s perceptions,
attitudes, and behaviors (Slater and Sanchez-Vives, 2014).
Transcending the self in immersive virtual reality. While there
have been a number of studies looking at social behaviors of
participants when they are exposed to virtual humans from other
demographic groups (Dotsch and Wigboldus, 2008), there is
increasing interest in the use of interactive virtual humans to
examine the impact of virtual embodiment on implicit social
cognitions related to the other’s age (Banakou et al., 2013);
body shape/size (van der Hoort et al., 2011; Normand et al.,
2011; Preston and Ehrsson, 2014); gender groups (Slater et al.,
2010); and race (Maister et al., 2013; Peck et al., 2013). For
example, Peck et al. (2013) demonstrated that when participants
experienced control of a dark-skinned virtual human there was
a decrease in implicit racial bias. Likewise, in an age-related
study Banakou et al. (2013) investigated the relationship between
implicit attitudes and embodiment in adult participants that
were immersed in virtual child bodies. Findings revealed that the
adults inhabiting the virtual child’s body overestimated the size of
objects. The participants also demonstrated implicit attitude and
behavioral changes that appearedmore child-like. It is interesting
to note that when the participants were in an adult body that
was the size of a child’s body they did not exhibit such changes.
Maister et al. (2015) have suggested that changes in implicit
attitudes occur via a process of self-association that occurs in
the physical feeling (i.e., perceived increase in bodily similarity
between self and other) domain and then extends to the cognitive
(conceptual generalization of positive self-like associations to the
other) domain.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The purpose of the review is to emphasize the potential of virtual
reality for precise presentation and control of dynamic perceptual
stimuli that can be used for assessment of neurocognitive
and affective processing while participants are immersed in
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simulations of real world contexts. Historically, this work has
relied on simple and static stimuli (e.g., Stroop for clinical; IGT
for affective, and schematic faces for social neuroscience) lacking
many of the potentially important advantages in advanced
technology and characteristics of real world activities and
interactions. The current review suggests that the promise
of the approach described here has already started to be
realized. For example, in the clinical neurosciences virtual
environment-based neuropsychological assessments allow for
real-time assessment of a participants cognitive and affective
processing in a manner that more closely resemble real-world
functional abilities (Matheis et al., 2007; Parsons and Rizzo,
2008). In affective neuroscience, virtual environments are also
being used to assess ‘‘Hot’’ processes of affective arousal both
clinical (Parsons and Rizzo, 2008) and nonclinical (Armstrong
et al., 2013; Parsons et al., 2013) studies. Finally, for social
neuroscience, virtual environments offer the social neuroscientist
the ability to induce a feeling of ‘‘presence’’ in participants as
they experience emotionally engaging background narratives to
enhance affective experience and social interactions (Gorini et al.,
2011; Diemer et al., 2015).
It is important to reiterate that the use of virtual
environments advocated here does not seek to minimize the
contribution of traditional (paper-and-pencil and computerized)
neuropsychological assessments that use static stimuli. The
neuropsychological assessment measures in clinical neuroscience
and the static stimuli in social neuroscience have numerous
benefits for researchers as evidenced by the progress made using
such tests and stimuli. The approach advocated here calls for
the ‘‘addition’’ (not replacement) of virtual environments to
neuropsychological batteries in situations where researchers
desire to have some idea of real world functioning. Another
important note is that in some neuroimaging research, the
approach suggested will present methodological challenges.
While this is a challenge, there is no reason to abandon such
an effort. Understanding the neural correlates of Cold and Hot
processing using virtual environments represents an important
advance in clinical, affective, and social neuroscience. This
pursuit faces challenges given the complex nature of real world
interactions. This review presents one viable way to meet some of
the challenges. Given that virtual environments allow for precise
presentation and control of dynamic perceptual stimuli, they can
provide ecologically valid assessments that combine the control
and rigor of laboratory measures with emotionally engaging
background narratives to enhance assessment of cognition,
affect, and social interactions.
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